Philosophical Foundations of Dworkin's Theory of Rights

Fundamentación filosófica y teoría de los derechos de Dworkin

Drawing on a comprehensive PhD work aiming to identify the political, legal, moral, and philosophical assumptions to deem feasible the claim of the correct response in Law. Within this framework, rights in their operational dimension must be seen from a judicial role and a deontological perspective. This implies to aim for neutrality and universal applicability. The above notion is based on interpretative moral principles that allow us to think of rights “seriously”, that is, as a real and effective recognition before the majorities and the executive power, in which the legal system acts as guarantor without establishing preconditions.

All rights lie on the principle of—and the right to—equal consideration and respect. This is a theoretical construct which conceives rights as achievements against political guidelines or social goals imposed by the majorities. Thus, the theory of rights rests on a liberal egalitarian philosophical foundation, in which the guarantee and defense of those rights by judges is highlighted as a limitation against disproportionate impositions from the majorities or the legislative body.